A Go-based command-and-control framework for authorized security operations. Certificate-bound identity, scoped operations, and an operator-first interface—engineered for precision.
mTLS with mutual certificate authentication, AES-256-GCM encrypted TCP, HTTP polling with C2 profile masquerading, and DNS TXT-record tunnelling. Each transport is independently configurable and embeds credentials at build time via ldflags.
Built-in HTTP profiles that disguise beacon traffic as Microsoft Teams presence updates, Google Analytics beacons, or Cloudflare RUM telemetry. Custom profiles via YAML.
Real-time web dashboard with SSE live updates. Manage listeners, agents, sessions, tasks, and operations. Add listeners and activate agents directly from the browser.
Tunnel C2 traffic over DNS TXT record queries — effective where HTTP/TCP is blocked. The agent encodes beacon data into base64-padded TXT lookups; the teamserver resolves queries via its embedded resolver on UDP/53. No external DNS provider required.
Six kernel and userland modules targeting Windows telemetry: ETW patch, AMSI bypass, NTDLL unhooking from a clean on-disk copy, PPID spoofing to inherit a trusted parent, indirect syscalls via runtime trampoline, and SleepMask obfuscation during sleep intervals.
Kill Date forces the agent to self-terminate after a configured UTC timestamp — no operator action required. Working Hours restricts beacon callbacks to a defined daily window, reducing noise outside business hours. Both are embedded at build time via ldflags.
Garble integration rewrites symbol names, obfuscates string literals, and strips DWARF debug info at compile time. XOR obfuscation via ldflags XORs the agent's embedded server credential. The resulting binary has no visible function names, import table symbols, or plaintext strings.
Choose based on the target environment. All transports embed credentials at build time — zero flags on the agent binary.
Transport
Auth
Encryption
Default port
Firewall evasion
Interactive shell
Bandwidth
mTLS
Mutual certificate
TLS 1.3
4433
Low — raw TLS on non-standard port
✓ PTY (Linux)
High
TCP
HMAC token
AES-256-GCM
4444
Low — raw TCP
✓ PTY (Linux)
High
HTTP
Embedded token
TLS (HTTPS) + profile
443 / 80
High — mimics web traffic via C2 profiles
✓ PTY (Linux)
Medium
DNS
Embedded token
Base64 payload over UDP/53
53
Very high — DNS rarely blocked egress
Limited (one-shot)
Low
All transports support beacon and session mode. DNS interactive shell is one-shot exec; full PTY requires mTLS / TCP / HTTP. Transport reference →
OPSEC stack / 03
Eleven modules. Two platforms.
Each module is opt-in, embedded at build time, and independently documented with ldflags and verification steps.
Linux 5 modules
guardrailsAborts execution if environment checks fail — wrong hostname, missing env var, UID mismatch. Prevents detonation outside the intended target.
validatorValidates TLS server certificate fingerprint against an embedded SHA-256 pin. Blocks MITM analysis of agent traffic in a sandbox.
sleepmaskXOR-encrypts the agent's heap region before sleeping and decrypts on wake. Reduces in-memory IOCs visible to YARA-based scanners during dwell time.
canaryInjects a synthetic debug event. If a debugger is attached, the canary fires and the agent self-terminates before executing the beacon loop.
polymorphRe-encrypts embedded configuration literals on each run using a derived key. String-based signatures on the binary's data section do not persist across executions.
Windows 6 modules
etw-patchPatches EtwEventWrite in ntdll.dll to return immediately. Prevents ETW-based EDR telemetry from capturing agent activity, including .NET assembly loads and reflective injection.
amsi-bypassPatches AmsiScanBuffer to always return AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN. Disables Windows Defender AMSI scanning for in-memory payloads executed by the agent.
ntdll-unhookReplaces the in-memory ntdll.dll with a clean copy read directly from disk, removing userland hooks placed by EDR products in the syscall stubs.
ppid-spoofSpawns child processes with a spoofed parent PID. Process tree analysis shows a trusted system process as parent instead of the agent, reducing behavioural detections.
indirect-syscallRoutes sensitive NT API calls through a runtime trampoline that jumps directly into the syscall instruction, bypassing userland hooks without calling ntdll stubs.
sleepmask-winEncrypts the agent's private heap and decommits stack pages during sleep intervals. In-memory scanners operating during dwell time find no agent artefacts.
All modules are enabled via --opsec / --win-opsec flags at generate time. Presets: none · basic · full. OPSEC overview →
Platform support / 04
Linux and Windows. Same binary format.
Cross-compiled from the same Go source. Windows agents are produced with GOOS=windows CGO_ENABLED=1 and mingw-w64.
Capability
Linuxamd64
Windowsamd64
mTLS transport
✓Supported
✓Supported
TCP transport
✓Supported
✓Supported
HTTP + C2 profiles
✓Supported
✓Supported
DNS transport
✓Supported
✓Supported
Interactive PTY shell
✓Full PTY
One-shot exec
TCP port forwarding
✓Supported
✓Supported
OPSEC modules
5 modules
guardrails
validator
sleepmask
canary
polymorph
6 modules
etw-patch
amsi-bypass
ntdll-unhook
ppid-spoof
indirect-syscall
sleepmask-win
Kill Date / Working Hours
✓Supported
✓Supported
Garble + XOR hardening
✓Supported
✓Supported
Session + Beacon modes
✓Supported
✓Supported
Process listing
✓Supported
✓Supported
File system operations
✓Supported
✓Supported
Windows cross-compilation requires mingw-w64. See the installation guide for toolchain setup.
Quick start / 05
Up and running in minutes.
Zero-flag agent deployment. Credentials embedded at build time via ldflags.
Both operator interfaces share the same server-side policy and state.
Access & scopeRBAC, operations and target scope
Identity & sessionsEnrollment records and agent check-ins
Tasks & storageTask results and the SQLite journal
Select a component to explore its role. Moving lines illustrate communication, not live traffic.
Authorized security testing only.
Use Sentrava only within a documented authorization boundary. Keep PKI, credentials, and test databases separate from production systems.
Framework comparison / 07
Different frameworks. Different priorities.
Sentrava brings a CLI and browser dashboard around one policy-aware teamserver. Here is how that approach compares with Sliver, Mythic and Havoc.
01 / WORKFLOW
Two ways to operate.
Use the CLI or the React dashboard. Both share server-side operation scope, identities and task state.
02 / CONTROL
Explicit boundaries.
Agent enrollment, certificate revocation and role-based access are part of Sentrava’s documented MVP.
03 / STATE
One place for context.
A Go teamserver and SQLite store keep operations, tasks and an event journal together.
Compare the documented approaches below. On smaller screens, scroll horizontally to see every framework.
Sentrava, Sliver, Mythic and Havoc: interfaces, architecture, collaboration and extension models
Design choice
SentravaIntegrated control plane
SliverConsole-led workflow
MythicComposable platform
HavocDesktop workspace
Operator interface
CLI + web dashboardCobra / REPL and React
Interactive CLISeparate operator clients
React web interfaceCollaborative browser workspace
Qt desktop clientSession table and graph views
Core architecture
Go + SQLitegRPC and an HTTPS dashboard gateway
Go client / serverServer and clients run on Linux, Windows and macOS
Container-based servicesGo, GraphQL, PostgreSQL and RabbitMQ
Teamserver + clientGo server with a C++ / Qt interface
Operator & task context
Scoped operationsRBAC, enrollment and task ownership checks
Multiplayer sessionsOperator-to-server authentication with mTLS
Operation trackingOperators, task history, artifacts and shared context
Shared teamserverRegistered operators and an event viewer
Extension approach
Source-level experimentationPlugins and OPSEC packages are experimental in the current MVP
Scriptable workflowsJavaScript / TypeScript and Python scripting
Plug-in servicesPayload types, C2 profiles and integrations in separate containers
Custom agents & modulesService integration and Python API
What makes Sentrava’s approach distinct?
The combination of CLI and browser access, SQLite-backed state and explicit enrollment / operation boundaries is its focus. These are design choices, not claims that other frameworks lack access control or task tracking.
Sources & comparison scope Reviewed 23 October 2026
This is a comparison of documented designs, not a performance, detection or security benchmark. Sentrava reflects its current development README; Mythic reflects the 4.0 documentation. Capabilities vary by release and installed agent. The original Havoc repository is archived.
Sentrava — project README: verified MVP boundary, server and operator surfaces. The supported MVP is Linux/amd64 over enrolled mTLS; other transport and platform claims elsewhere on this site are not included in this comparison.